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Letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the state border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of September 2017 (see annex I).**

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) during the month of September 2017 (see annex II).**

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons on 16 October 2017.
** Circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-30 September 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 September	Tavush Region	19	Small arms and light weapons: 247
	Chinari	5	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 74
	Aygedzor	6	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Aygedzor)
	Aygepar	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 30
	Movses	4	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
2 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 138
	Jil	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Jil 25)
	Pambak	1	
	Aygepar	2	
3 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 65
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 25
	Mehrab	1	
4 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 210
	Aygepar	1	
	Movses	1	
	Jil	2	
	Pambak	1	
5 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 3
	Aygepar	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Chambarak	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 25
6 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 92
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Chapni	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Chapni 5; Jil 7)
	Jil	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 380
	Vahan	1	Small-calibre mortars: 2
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	2	
	Kayanavan	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
	Khachik	1	
7 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	13	Small arms and light weapons: 750
	Pambak	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Gyunashli 8)
	Vahan	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 280
	Gyunashli	3	
	Chambarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Jil	2	
	Aygepar	3	
	Eraskh	1	
	Shaghat	1	
8 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 162
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Vahan	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 95
	Paravakar	3	
	Aygepar	1	
	Vazashen	2	
	Sarigyugh	1	
	Kayanavan	1	
	Sevqar	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
9 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 118
	Daranak	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Mehrab	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Daranak)
	Paravaqar	2	
	Vazashen	1	
	Aygehovit	1	
	Kayanavan	2	
10 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 1,514
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Kakhakn	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Kakhakan 1)
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Eraskh	1	
	Vazashen	1	
11 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 705
	Jil	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Kakhakn	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30
	Aygedzor	1	
	Mehrab	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Shaghat	1	
12 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 185
	Chapni	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 31
	Tsapatagh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 35
	Aygedzor	2	
	Paravaqar	1	
13 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor, Syunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 43 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Agarak)
	Martiros	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
	Vazashen	1	
	Agarak	2	
14 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 166
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8
	Jil	1	
	Aygepar	2	
15 September	Tavush Region	9	Small arms and light weapons: 598
	Mehrab	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 170
	Chinari	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Chapni 3; Movses 5)
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 40
	Movses	1	
16 September	Tavush, Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 171
	Mehrab	1	
	Movses	2	
	Khachik	1	
17 September	Tavush Region	3	Small arms and light weapons: 12
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
18 September	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Ararat Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 89
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Jil)
	Vazashen	1	
	Eraskh	1	
19 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 11
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	
20 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 18
			Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Jil)
	Jil	2	
	Aygepar	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
21 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 14
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1
	Shaghat	3	
22 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 47
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Avazan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Agarak)
	Chinari	1	
	Agarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 70
	Vahan	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Aygedzor)
	Aygedzor	1	
24 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 23
	Jil	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Aygepar	1	
	Nerkin Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Berkaber	1	
25 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 42
	Chinari	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Jil	1	
26 September	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	2	Small arms and light weapons: 7
	Jil	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Chambarak	1	
27 September	Tavush, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik Regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 92
			Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Jil	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Tsapatagk)
	Tsapatagh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 15
	Kutakan	1	
	Aygedzor	1	
	Chinari	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Vazashen	1	
	Koti	1	
	Bardzruni	1	
28 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 21
	Aygedzor	1	
	Paravakar	1	
29 September	Tavush Region	17	Small arms and light weapons: 419
	Mehrab	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 75
	Paravakar	3	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Koti)
	Aygepar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 10
	Kayanavan	1	
	Berkaber	4	
	Koti	2	
	Baghanis	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
30 September	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 10
	Aygehovit	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5
	Baghanis	1	

Annex II to the letter dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic)

1-30 September 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
1 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 171 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Mehdili 1; Gjulistan 12) Large-calibre machine guns: 14
2 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
3 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 338 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Veysali)
4 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	13	Small arms and light weapons: 177 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Mehdili)
5 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 233 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 16 (Shikhlyar 6; Gjulistan 10)
6 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 177 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 36
7 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 582 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Talish)
8 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 259 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli) Large-calibre machine guns: 4
9 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 472 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 25
10 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 160 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
11 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 100 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli)
12 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 211 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli) Grenade launchers: 1
13 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 307 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Gjulistan)
14 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 271 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Gjulistan 10; Mehdili 7)
15 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 167 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 28 (Gjulistan 8; Seysulan 20)
16 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 124 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Gjulistan 15; Shikhlyar 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 15
17 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 284 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32
18 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	32	Small arms and light weapons: 458 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3
19 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 694 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (Shikhlyar)
20 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 292 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Mehdili 15; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 1; Gjulistan 7) Large-calibre machine guns: 40
21 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	22	Small arms and light weapons: 195 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Gjulistan)
22 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	42	Small arms and light weapons: 778 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 19 (Karachuk 1; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 1; Korgan 2; Gyulistan 15) Large-calibre machine guns: 13 Grenade launchers: 15

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/shots*
23 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	29	Small arms and light weapons: 527 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 32 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Kengerli) Large-calibre machine guns: 20
24 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 321 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 12 (Gjulistan 8; Marzili 1; Mehdili 3)
25 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 194 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Gjulistan) Large-calibre machine guns: 4
26 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 244 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre machine guns: 6
27 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 460 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Mehdili)
28 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	11	Small arms and light weapons: 281 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
29 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	15	Small arms and light weapons: 289 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
30 September	On the Line of Contact between the armed forces of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 236 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 6; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 7)

During the reporting period, 1 soldier of the Defence Army of Artsakh was killed and 2 soldiers were wounded from fire by Azerbaijani side.

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Letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

It is my honour to inform you that on 5 and 6 June 2017, Slovakia held a High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace, with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The Conference gathered over 100 participants, as well as representatives of multilateral organizations, including among others, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank.

It is my pleasure to present to you the outcome document of the high-level event, which highlights the recommendations that emerged from the deliberations (see annex).

Please allow me to express our sincere gratitude and commend the dedicated work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its Security Sector Reform Unit. The Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, co-chaired by Slovakia and South Africa, remains committed to supporting the United Nations in enhancing its role and approaches to security sector reform.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Michal **Mlynár**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

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Annex to the letter dated 3 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace: Challenges and Opportunities

Outcome document

1. The High-level Conference on the Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustaining Peace: Challenges and Opportunities, was held on 5 and 6 June 2017, in Bratislava, Slovakia, with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The conference gathered over 100 participants, as well as representatives of multilateral organizations, including, among others, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. The conference was opened by the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák, who stated that it was time to take stock of multilateral approaches to support for security sector reform against the backdrop of recent policy developments in the area of sustaining peace. Moreover, he highlighted that the timing of the conference was opportune given his recent appointment as president of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

2. The present outcome document incorporates key findings and recommendations from the high-level conference. The recommendations emerging from the conference, as well as from the High-level Dialogue on Global Experiences in Security Sector Reform, held in New York in May 2017, and notably the seminar on the nexus between security sector reform, conflict prevention and peace sustainment, co-hosted by Slovakia and South Africa, and the seminar on conflict prevention and peace sustainment on the African continent, co-hosted by Senegal and South Africa, will serve as input to relevant discussions at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly.

3. The conference had a specific focus on the sustaining peace agenda, which has emerged as a new approach to preventing the outbreak, continuation and recurrence of conflict. The concept recognizes that building peace should not be limited to post-conflict contexts, and that it requires collective efforts across the entire peace continuum. Participants recognized that the two interrelated agendas of sustaining peace and sustainable development (the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) will have far-reaching implications for engagement by the United Nations in the areas of peace and security. While the primary responsibility for driving the efforts to sustain peace lies with national authorities, there are increasing calls to rethink the United Nations approach to supporting these efforts and that of the broader international community. In the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, cooperation with multilateral organizations is vital to support efforts to prevent the outbreak, escalation and recurrence of conflict.

4. Security sector reform plays an important role in contributing to peace sustainment. As reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 2151 (2014), "an effective, professional and accountable security sector without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law is the cornerstone of peace and sustainable development and is important for conflict prevention". The conference reviewed the extent to which multilateral organizations are effectively equipped to deliver support to security sector reform in a way that is able to contribute to sustaining peace. More specifically, the conference sought to examine the role

security sector reform plays across different policy areas related to the success of peace sustainment, in particular, conflict prevention, peacekeeping/stabilization, and sustainable development.

5. To this effect, the conference started with a high-level panel on the role of security sector reform in sustaining peace, which examined the implications of the new sustaining peace agenda for multilateral organizations. Moderated by Ambassador Thomas Guerber of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the high-level panel included Ambassador Jerry Mathews Matjila, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, Ambassador Fodé Seck, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary-General of OSCE, Alexander Zouev, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Deputy Director General, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The conference continued with three thematic sessions: a session on security sector reform and peacekeeping/stabilization, which reflected on whether the support of multilateral organizations for security sector reform is appropriately adapted to meet the needs of peacekeeping and stabilization contexts; a second thematic session focused on security sector reform and sustainable development, which examined the opportunities that the 2030 Agenda offers to revitalize international support to security sector reform; and a third thematic session that examined the linkages between security sector reform and prevention and, in particular, the important role that security sector reform can play in preventing violent conflict. A session on sustaining peace through security sector reform was conducted in a round-table format to bring together representatives of multilateral organizations to discuss the main findings emerging through the thematic sessions and to identify concrete recommendations that may be taken forward.

Role of security sector reform support in sustaining peace

6. During the high-level panel on the role of security sector reform in sustaining peace it was recognized that in order for security sector reform support to contribute to the broader objective of peace sustainment, security sector reform needs to be perceived as an integral component of broader institution-building efforts. Security sector reform support therefore needs to be linked to a proper governance framework and a national reform agenda based on a long-term vision. Moreover, it was noted that one of the commonalities between the 2030 Agenda and the sustaining peace agenda is that neither will work if they are not founded on the principle of inclusivity. From a security sector reform perspective, it was recognized that this requires enhanced understanding of the role that the security sector may play in reinforcing tensions among the very population it is meant to protect. Fundamentally, security sector reform needs to be approached as a political process that is inclusive of all national stakeholders.

7. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and peacekeeping/stabilization, it was recognized that given the reality that multilateral organizations are often engaged in the same contexts side-by-side, there is a need for predictability in terms of the type of support that each organization will cover. Time is often lost while each organization separately assesses security sector needs, maps what others are doing and identifies a division of labour. It was also highlighted that the broad challenges of peacekeeping are further compounded in so-called "stabilization" contexts, where armed violence is still ongoing and no peace agreement has been achieved.

8. It was noted that in order to strengthen the impact that security sector reform support can have in peacekeeping contexts, there is a need to better integrate security sector reform into broader planning processes and, in particular, to find the right balance between attending to pressing needs without disregarding important long-term goals in planning processes. It was also noted that there is a need to move beyond "train-and-equip" approaches to security assistance that promotes technical modernization while placing effective controls on the use of force. It was recognized that the type of support provided during early stages peacekeeping will have long-term effects on the extent to which security sector reform support will be sustainable.

9. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and sustainable development, it was underlined that security sector reform has a vital role to play in contributing to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 16, as well as to related goals, such as on gender equality, safer cities and reducing inequalities. Thus, to meet the commitments made in the Sustainable Development Goals, States will need to mainstream good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights throughout the security sector. It was recognized that the 2030 Agenda promotes the understanding that the governance of the security sector is a universal agenda.

10. It was recognized that while security sector reform has the potential to play an important role in advancing the 2030 Agenda, its effective usage as a tool for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals faces a number of challenges. For instance, it is a reality that the work of political, security and development actors in the area of security sector reform often remain siloed, thus limiting opportunities for developing the coherent long-term approaches to support called for in the Sustainable Development Goals. It was noted that there is a need to learn from approaches promoted by the development community for strengthening coordination, such as the "one vision, one plan" approach. In order to strengthen the ability of security sector reform to advance the 2030 Agenda, there is also a need to address a number of issues relating to the lack of comprehensive data to inform adequate analysis of security sector needs, as well as to track progress in reaching security sector governance objectives.

11. In relation to the thematic session on security sector reform and prevention, it was recognized that poor governance of the security sector and its role in committing, or failing to protect the population from, human rights abuses play a role in triggering or prolonging conflicts. It was also highlighted that security sector reform should be seen as a broader confidence-building measure. While security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts, it was noted there have been few efforts to understand what this means and how it could be achieved. It is expected that the upcoming United Nations and World Bank study on prevention will shed light on how different tools and approaches can contribute to preventing violent conflicts.

12. It was noted that in order to strengthen the preventive effects of security sector reform support, it will be necessary to further reflect on how to build the resilience of the security sector to stand up to anti-democratic forces and to prevent violence from escalating. Security sector reform within the framework of prevention therefore requires strengthening the analysis of potential exclusion generated or maintained by the security sector, and identifying entry points for addressing the issue. Such action requires better understanding of the vulnerabilities of the security sector through appropriate assessments and analysis of conflict drivers. It will also require accepting the fundamentally political nature of security sector reform, through which important questions about power and exclusion and/or inclusion should be addressed at both the national and local levels.

Recommendations

13. A number of recommendations were identified during the conference for strengthening the role of multilateral organizations in security sector reform support as a contribution towards the broader goal of sustaining peace. The recommendations are presented below, grouped according to whether they are context-specific or cross-cutting.

Context-specific recommendations

(a) In the area of peacekeeping/stabilization, there is a need to reflect on what are the minimum standards for security sector reform support. It was noted that an increasing challenge in these contexts is the tendency for international actors to seek quick fixes through "train-and-equip" programmes that are not linked to broader governance objectives. This challenge is further compounded in stabilization contexts where the lack of political settlement and/or ongoing armed fighting makes support to reform efforts very difficult.

- It is recommended that international actors engaged in both stabilization and peacekeeping contexts ensure that "train-and-equip" approaches are not delivered without parallel efforts to strengthen the democratic governance of the security sector.
- It is recommended that international actors identify and prioritize what type of support may feasibly be provided in peacekeeping/stabilization contexts to build the foundations for future reform efforts.

(b) In the area of sustainable development, it was recognized that security sector reform should be seen as an accelerator for the 2030 Agenda. It was noted that the 2030 Agenda provides an important entry point for engaging Governments in dialogue on how to strengthen the governance of the security sector. It was acknowledged that more efforts need to be made to capitalize on this opportunity and to raise awareness about the importance of prioritizing security sector reform as a key component of the 2030 Agenda, in particular Goal 16, which calls for "peaceful and inclusive societies" as well as "effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels", including security and justice institutions. Moreover, it was noted that security sector reform support can contribute to efforts to address bottlenecks and thereby achieve broader development goals.

- It is recommended that further efforts be made to link security sector reform to the broader policy agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular, to raise awareness of the role that security sector reform can play as an accelerator for the 2030 Agenda.
- It is recommended that multilateral organizations reflect on how to better mainstream elements of the 2030 Agenda into their security sector reform support, including through the promotion of local approaches to security sector reform and enhanced cooperation across development and security actors.

(c) In the area of prevention, there is a need to enhance reflection on how security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts. Such action requires a better understanding of the potential role that the security sector may play in reinforcing tensions across the very population it is meant to protect. On the one hand, examining the extent to which the security sector is representative of different ethnic, religious and other groups. On the other hand, it also requires looking at the degree to which legitimate State institutions deliver security to all people, regardless of race, religion or gender.

- It is recommended that further efforts be made to reflect on how security sector reform can contribute to prevention efforts within the framework of broader policy initiatives to strengthen prevention. In particular, calls were made to identify concrete institution-building measures that can contribute to building the resilience of the security sector.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations better integrate security sector reform into existing conflict analysis tools. Such tools should, among other issues, reflect on the role the security sector may play in contributing to the root drivers of conflict.

Cross-cutting recommendations

(d) Strengthen partnerships among multilateral organizations in support of enhanced predictability on the ground. To contribute to broader efforts to sustain peace, it is important that multilateral organizations engaged in security sector reform support can rapidly map the situation on the ground, identify gaps in support and agree on roles and responsibilities according to a shared understanding of comparative advantages. It was recognized that effective partnerships are necessary to meet those requirements. In practice, however, it was noted that such cooperation often does not take place until actors are deployed on the ground and it is too late to realign resources.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations reflect on how to ensure early cooperation, before it is too late to realign support, which requires engaging in gap analysis to identify what is already being done by partners and what remains to be done.

- It is recommended that international coordination in the area of security sector reform move towards coordination approaches such as those that have been used in other sectors, including development.

- It is recommended that principles for bilateral and multilateral assistance to security sector reform be developed so that they are in line with broader principles of aid effectiveness.

(e) Strengthen partnerships among multilateral organizations in support of learning lessons. Empirical research is vital to better understand what is working, what is not working and what measures need to be taken to enhance the delivery of international security sector reform support on the ground. It was recognized that more efforts are required to invest in research, analysis and the development of strategic guidance. It was noted that partnerships should be strengthened among multilateral organizations with the aim of sharing experiences and good practice.

- It is recommended that more efforts be made to engage in empirically-based research and to ensure that emerging lessons are shared and discussed across multilateral organizations through dedicated meetings.

- It is recommended that a collective overview of available security sector reform-related guidance be shared among multilateral organizations.

(f) Strengthen multilateral organizations' approaches to planning for security sector reform support. It was underlined that a common challenge for multilateral organizations is to effectively integrate security sector reform into broader planning processes. In particular, planning often focuses on immediate needs without taking into account the need to plan for long-term needs. In the context of peacekeeping, another challenge identified is that, in practice, efforts are made to ensure that all main topics are addressed in assessments, which often leads to overloading mandates with competing tasks, without clear priorities. It was underlined that

effective partnerships for security sector reform support require enhanced efforts to jointly assess and prioritize needs as well as a commitment to adapting support accordingly.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations engage where possible in joint security sector reform assessments, and that the findings from those assessments are jointly analysed and acted upon.
- It is recommended that efforts be made to identify both immediate and longer-term needs which are in line with broader national goals, and to appropriately prioritize such needs.
- It is recommended that, where obstacles to cooperation exist between multilateral organizations, such as incompatible timelines and processes, that those be addressed through established coordination mechanisms at the highest level.

(g) Identify approaches to harness necessary expertise for security sector reform support. It was underlined that while multilateral organizations have developed security sector reform-related capacities at both headquarters and in the field, many challenges remain in the ability to leverage the expertise required at the necessary moment. In particular, it was noted that with the fast-changing needs on the ground, it is no longer possible to host all necessary expertise within an organization. Moreover, the specialized experts required for different areas of security sector reform support are often not available. It was recognized that there will increasingly be a need to rely on external capacities, which can be provided through partnerships as well as the establishment of rosters.

- It is recommended that partnerships across security, development and human rights actors be strengthened to enable better sharing of expertise. For instance, development actors can contribute expertise in the broader area of public administration reform, while human rights actors can provide knowledge on root drivers of conflict related to social and political exclusion, human rights violations and discrimination. More efforts are required to connect those actors to one another and ensure that they are working towards a common goal.
- It is recommended that efforts be made to invest in the further development and usage of rosters. While rosters already exist, or are in the process of being created, there is a need to ensure that there are mechanisms for sharing information across multilateral organizations.

(h) Promote inclusive approaches to security sector reform support as called for in the 2030 Agenda and sustaining peace agenda. One of the commonalities between the 2030 Agenda and the sustaining peace agenda is that neither one will work if it is not founded on the principle of inclusivity. It was recognized that this requires inclusive approaches to security sector reform support that includes both men and women and engaging with stakeholders at both the national and local levels. More broadly, it was recognized that this also requires engaging with non-State actors, in particular customary and traditional actors. It was acknowledged that while multilateral organizations are by definition State-based, they need to find ways to overcome challenges in engaging with non-State actors.

- It is recommended that assessments examine the extent to which the security sector is representative of different ethnic, religious and other groups. This also requires looking at the degree to which legitimate State institutions deliver security to all people, regardless of race, religion or gender.

- It is recommended that multilateral organizations seek to identify approaches to engage more with non-State actors as appropriate. Many of the security threats being faced require engaging with non-State actors. Moreover, there are many customary and traditional institutions that are able to support the delivery of security to the population and continue to function, even in fragile contexts. There is therefore a need to overcome the friction between the legitimacy of traditional institutions and the legality of State-based institutions.

(i) Promote security sector reform as part of broader institution-building. It was recognized that security sector reform should be understood as an integral part of broader institution-building, which takes place on an ongoing basis in all countries. There has been an increasing tendency to focus on short-term measures, such as train-and-equip programmes, that do not build the foundations for an effective and accountable security sector. There were strong calls to link security sector reform to broader public administration reform efforts, such as public expenditure reviews, in order to contribute to the sustainability of reform efforts.

- It is recommended that support to security sector reform, as part of broader institution-building, be strengthened through dedicated support programmes across all contexts, as relevant, including peacekeeping.

- It is recommended that efforts be made to secure funding for institution-building efforts that require sustained commitment, as well as to build partnerships across security and development actors on this issue.

(j) Raise understanding among Member States about the long-term nature of security sector reform. It was recognized that security sector reform is a generational process that cannot fit into short timelines. While Member States have a responsibility to hold multilateral organizations to account for progress made, it must be recognized that room should also be given to those organizations to invest in supporting long-term nationally-driven processes, which may not always deliver immediate tangible outcomes in the short-term. A balance needs to be found between the need to strengthen accountability through enhanced monitoring and evaluation and the need to factor in the long-term nature of security sector reform.

- It is recommended that Member States recognize the long-term nature of security sector reform support and that, while enhanced monitoring and evaluation should be promoted, there is a need to also acknowledge that important longer-term results may take time to materialize.

- It is recommended that Member States support long-term approaches to security sector reform based on predictable funding, including through trust funds. Calls were also made to strengthen the capacity of the secretariat of the United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, which plays an important coordinating role in the United Nations system.

Way ahead

14. The present outcome document will be distributed to the respective Group of Friends of security sector reform in New York and OSCE in Vienna and other multilateral organizations, including the European Union, OECD, World Bank and others. It will serve as a contribution to efforts to further anchor the security sector reform agenda in multilateral forums and to enhance the effectivity and sustainability of international support to security sector reform.

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Agenda item 121
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit on behalf of 25 Member States[1] of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group a note on the selection process of the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2015 and 2016 (see annex). The cross-regional Group played a leading role in the negotiations on the revitalization of the General Assembly on increased transparency, inclusiveness and accountability of the process for selecting the ninth Secretary-General, and we hope that the note will serve as a reference for future selection processes.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 121, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sven **Jürgenson**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

[1] Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

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Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 5 October 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Lessons learned on the selection and appointment of the ninth Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2015 and 2016

In 2014, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT Group)[1] started its work to increase the transparency, inclusiveness and accountability of the process for selecting the next Secretary-General. The selection process, which had been the same for the previous 70 years, was viewed by many as outdated and not fit for purpose. Member States, parliamentarians and civil society organizations from across the globe argued that a process conducted in secret by the Security Council was no longer appropriate and would not guarantee the selection of the best possible candidate.

The ACT Group believes that the General Assembly has the right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions 69/321 and 70/305 and other relevant decisions, to play a more active role in the selection process. In 2015 and 2016, the Group worked to help empower the Assembly and its President to engage directly with candidates; it also set expectations on the selection criteria and encouraged the Security Council towards a more inclusive and transparent approach.

The ACT Group played a leading role in the negotiations on the revitalization of the General Assembly, and the main objectives outlined in its position papers from March 2015 and February 2016,[2] from declared candidatures to open hearings, became integral parts of Assembly resolutions 69/321 and 70/305.

The members of the ACT Group are convinced that the standards achieved and the principles set out in the resolutions on the revitalization of the General Assembly should be applied and strengthened in all future selection processes. To that end, the Group suggests the proposals set out below.

General Assembly and the President of the General Assembly

- The General Assembly, through its Member States and its President, must continue to play a key role in all future selection processes. The ACT Group recalls that it is the Assembly that is, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, responsible for appointing the Secretary-General. It is essential that the Secretary-General enjoy the widest possible support among the membership.
- For the ACT Group, it is crucial that the role of the General Assembly in the selection process be consolidated. The role of the President of the General Assembly in the process is also critical; the Group encourages the proactive engagement by the President of the General Assembly across the entire selection cycle.
- In the view of the ACT Group, negotiations on outstanding issues with regard to the role of the General Assembly must be carried through without delay in

[1] The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group is a cross-regional group of 25 States that includes: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay.

[2] See http://www.un.estemb.org/news/aid-1348 and http://www.un.estemb.org/news/aid-1349.

the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, notwithstanding the actual selection cycle.

Selection timeline and the nomination of candidates

- Providing a structured time frame for the selection process greatly enhanced the selection process in 2015 and 2016. The ACT Group believes that a deadline for the presentation of candidatures, as well as a timeline for the overall process, such as that set out below, should be followed for future processes, while bearing in mind that ultimately the best possible candidate should be appointed.
- The ACT Group proposes an indicative timeline for appointment of future Secretaries-General, as follows:
    - October of the year preceding appointment: joint letter from the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council to all United Nations Member States encouraging the nomination of qualified candidates;
    - 1 April of the appointment year: deadline for the submission of candidatures;
    - End of June of the appointment year: deadline for the completion of General Assembly hearings with all candidates;
    - 1 October: deadline for the Security Council recommendation and the resolution from the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General.
- The ACT Group encourages the early presentation of qualified candidates, as late nominations may not allow sufficient time for full evaluation.
- The ACT Group welcomes the value added by various stakeholders, including civil society, in searching for suitable candidates on their own initiative as an input for consideration by Member States.
- The ACT Group calls on all candidates to participate fully in the overall selection process.

Selection process and informal meetings with the candidates

- The General Assembly should play an active role in the selection process, in accordance with the Charter, resolutions 69/321 and 70/305 and other relevant decisions.
- For the ACT Group, the informal dialogues and meetings with the candidates are a key part of the selection process. It expects all candidates to take part in the meetings and to circulate a document outlining their policy priorities in advance. The fact that the President of the General Assembly insisted during the latest selection on following the same procedure for all of the candidates prevented any attempts at selecting a candidate from outside the list.
- The ACT Group sees possibilities to further improve the format of the informal dialogues by making them more interactive, for example by increasing the time available to candidates to provide responses and by having the President of the General Assembly play an active role as moderator, including by seeking to avoid the duplication of questions.
- The ACT Group calls for ensuring that civil society can continue to actively participate in the informal dialogues and meetings with the candidates, and

also encourages candidates themselves to interact with civil society organizations. Furthermore, the Group encourages civil society to continue working towards improving the selection process of the Secretary-General and continue its efforts towards ensuring that the best possible candidate will be appointed, for example by looking into the practice of existing panels of highly regarded individuals who review candidates and their qualifications for similar senior positions, in order to assist Member States in their assessments.

- The ACT Group encourages the consideration of possible ways to assess the level of General Assembly support for the candidates throughout the process.

Interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly

- The ACT Group notes the collaboration between the General Assembly and the Security Council in launching the process and circulating information on the nominated candidates. The Group also welcomes the holding of monthly meetings between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council and values the summaries shared with all Member States.
- Nevertheless, the ACT Group believes that the interaction between the Security Council and the General Assembly needs to be improved to live up to the expectations of the membership and the new standard of openness and transparency.
- In that regard, the ACT Group encourages the Security Council to review its working methods, building on the discussions held among Council members during the latest selection process. For example, the Group believes that collective discussions within the Council on the merit, skills or experience of individual candidates would enhance Council decision-making.
- The ACT Group recalls the collective responsibility of the Security Council to reach consensus on a recommendation to the General Assembly for the appointment of the Secretary-General. In that regard, the Group believes the use of colour-coded ballots during straw polling should be discouraged and the equal rights and role of all Council members in the process should be upheld.
- The ACT Group calls for regular public briefings by the Security Council on developments in the nomination process and open communication of straw poll results.

Identification, appointment and reappointment

- In identifying the best candidate for appointment, personal qualification is the most important criterion for appointment, while due regard should be given to fair geographical distribution through rotation and to gender balance.
- The ACT Group recalls the prerogative of the General Assembly to draft the resolution for the appointment of the Secretary-General and proposes that the draft resolution be finalized at the Assembly's earliest convenience to ensure that the process is not linked to any individual candidate.
- The ACT Group welcomes the informal meeting of the General Assembly with the Secretary-General-designate convened by the President of the General Assembly in November 2016, with the aim of assisting him in his preparation for office, and encourages similar meetings in the framework of future processes of appointment of Secretaries-General.
- The ACT Group believes that all of the provisions in the present document regarding the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General should apply

in the event that an incumbent Secretary-General seeks or is proposed for reappointment.

- In line with the provisions of the Charter and the oath taken by the Secretary-General, the ACT Group believes that the Secretary-General should exercise complete independence in the selection of senior officials, with due regard to geographical and gender balance. Recalling General Assembly resolution 70/305, the appointment process of the executive heads and the Senior Management Group of the Organization should be inclusive and transparent and there should not be a monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States.
- In that regard, the ACT Group proposes that the principles governing the appointment of executive heads and the Senior Management Group of the organization be formally established.
- The ACT Group believes that the oath of office of the Secretary-General should be updated.

Term in office

- The ACT Group would like to continue the discussion and see an informed decision taken within the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly by all States on the term of office of the Secretary-General, including the proposal to establish a single, non-renewable term for future Secretaries-General.